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SELECTED OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
3rd Circuit 
 
Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 2015 WL 
3895209, No. 12-3613 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
 
Oil and Gas Lessors brought action against Lessee, 
seeking a declaration that the lease was invalid due to 
fraudulent inducement. Lessee counterclaimed for an 
equitable extension of the lease. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Lessee 
validating the lease, but entered judgment in favor of 
Lessor regarding the equitable extension counterclaim. 
The Lessee appealed the equitable extension judgment. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that an oil and 
gas Lessor’s pursuit of declaratory relief to invalidate a 
lease does not result in repudiation of the lease, and as a 
result, does not entitle Lessee to equitable extension of 
the primary term. 
 
5th Circuit 
 
Contango Operators, Inc. v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 2015 
WL 3407402, No. 14-20265 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 
Weeks Marine and the United States appealed a 
judgment holding them 40% and 60% liable, 
respectively, for damages to Contango. Contango 
suffered as a result of a dredging accident. The accident 
occurred as a result of Weeks’ failure to locate a 
pipeline installed by Contango prior to dredging off the 
coast of Louisiana. The District Court held that Weeks 
was liable for breaching its duty of reasonable care by 
relying solely on specifications that did not show the 
pipeline in question. The United States challenged the 
findings solely on the issue of whether or not an 
exculpatory clause in Contango’s pipeline permit 
precludes holding it liable. The Fifth Circuit held that 
the District Court did not err in finding Weeks 40% 
liable because the risk of causing the damage 
substantially outweighed downloading new, updated 
maps of pipeline locations. The court declined to 
review the exculpatory clause. 
 
8th Circuit 
 
Shields v. Wilkinson, 2015 WL 3634541, No. 13-3773 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
 
Indian landowners allotted by the United States under 
the Dawes Act of 1887, and currently held in trust by 
the United States government, brought suit against oil 
and gas lessee’s for aiding, abetting, and inducing the 
United States into breaching its fiduciary duty as 
trustee. The District Court dismissed the action after 
determining that the United States government was a 
required party and that the action could not proceed 
because sovereign immunity barred the United States 
from being joined. The Appellate Court affirmed.  
 
10th Circuit 
 
Pueblo of Jemez v. U.S., 2015 WL 3916572, No. 13-
2181 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 
The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United 
States under federal common law and the Quiet Title 
Act (QTA), seeking to quiet aboriginal title to the 
lands in question. The government filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state 
a claim. The District Court dismissed the action, and 
found that the Pueblo’s claim lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. Under the 
Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), the federal 
government waived the right to sovereign immunity; 
however, all claims accruing before 1946 were 
subject to a five-year statute of limitations. The 
District Court determined the Pueblo’s claim arose in 
1860, and therefore had no cause of action. On 
appeal, the Court reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. The Court found in favor of the Pueblo 
and held that the Pueblo’s claim to aboriginal title 
was not extinguished by a land grant or subsequent 
conveyances. 
 
District of Columbia  
 
Noble Energy, Inc. v. Jewell, 2015 WL 3544371, CV 
No. 14-898 (CKK) (D.D.C. 2015). 
 
In 1985, Noble Energy temporarily plugged a well 
off the coast of California with the intentions to 
ultimately recomplete or permanently plug the well. 
In the interim, Noble’s lease was indefinitely 
suspended; leaving Noble unable to recomplete or 
permanently plug the well. Lease termination was 
revoked in the Court of Appeals, and the government 
was found in breach of its lease agreement. Despite 
the ruling, the government then ordered Noble to 
permanently plug the well, and Noble subsequently 
challenged the order. On review, the Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the government and 
held the discharge doctrine does not relieve an 
operator of regulatory obligations even when the 
government was in material breach of the instrument 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss2/5
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under which the obligations arose.  
 
Hermes Consol., LLC v. E.P.A., 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015). 
 
Hermes, an oil refining company, sought judicial 
review of the EPA’s denial of its petition for extension 
of its economic hardship exemption from the EPA’s 
renewable fuels program. Per the 2005 Clean Air Act 
amendment, the EPA administers a renewable fuels 
program under which oil refineries must satisfy annual 
obligations concerning production of renewable fuels. 
Hermes had obtained an exemption through 2012, 
however, it unsuccessfully petitioned for an extension 
through 2014. The dispute arose out of the EPA’s 
interpretation of the term “disproportionate economic 
hardship.” After the 2005 Amendment, Congress was 
aware that small refineries would face greater difficulty 
complying with the renewable fuels requirements. 
Congress created a three-tiered system of exemption to 
afford small refineries a bridge to compliance. An 
exemption is allowed if a petitioner shows a 
disproportionate economic hardship encompassing: (1) 
a high cost of compliance relative to the industry 
average and (2) an effect sufficient to cause a 
significant impairment of the refinery operations. The 
Court of Appeals held that the EPA’s method of 
evaluating the “disproportionate economic hardship” 
was based on a permissible construction of the statute.  
 
State 
 
Kansas 
 
Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, No. 108,666, 
2015 WL 4033549 (Kan. 2015). 
 
Operator entered into a third-party gas purchase 
agreement, under which certain post-production costs 
were deducted from the price paid to the Operator. 
Royalties paid to Lessors were based upon the price 
ultimately paid to Operator. Lessors filed suit, arguing 
that the post-production costs were the sole 
responsibility of Operator under the marketable 
condition rule, which requires operators to make gas 
marketable at their own expense. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for Lessors, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, 
holding that Operator is not obligated as a matter of law 
under the marketable condition rule to bear post-
production costs that may be necessarily incurred to 
convert raw gas into the quality required to enter 
interstate pipelines. 
 
Missouri 
 
In Matter of Verified Application and Petition of 
Liberty Energy (Midstates) Corp., No. SC 94470, 
2015 WL 3759566 (Mo. 2015). 
 
Liberty Energy Corporation, a provider of natural gas 
and transportation services, filed a petition with the 
Public Service Commission seeking an adjustment of 
its rate schedule and seeking reimbursement for its 
infrastructure replacement costs. Public Counsel filed 
a motion in response to this petition and an 
evidentiary hearing was held. The Commission 
approved the rate increase and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme 
Court of Missouri granted a transfer. The Court 
determined, under the relevant statute, the damage 
caused by a contractor or another third party was not 
an infrastructure replacement that allowed for a 
recovery of costs.  
 
Ohio 
 
Dodd v. Croskey, No.2013-1730, 2015 WL 3773491 
(Ohio 2015). 
 
Surface Owners published a notice of abandonment 
concerning the minerals underlying their property. 
Surface Owners sought to quiet title to the underlying 
mineral estate of a Mineral Interest Owner by 
asserting an abandonment claim. A Mineral Interest 
Owner filed an affidavit stating his intent to preserve 
his mineral interest. The lower court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Mineral Interest 
Owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Surface 
Owners sought discretionary appeal contending that 
there was no valid saving event during the Dormant 
Mineral Act’s 20-year window prior to the surface 
owner's notice of intent to declare abandonment. The 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that a claim to preserve 
a mineral interest filed within 60 days of notice of 
intent to declare a mineral interest abandoned was 
sufficient to preserve an interest to the minerals. 
 
Oklahoma 
 
Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC, No. 113396, 2015 WL 
3982748 (Okla. 2015).  
 
Property Owner filed a private tort action in District 
Court against Operators, alleging that Operators’ 
wastewater disposal practices caused an earthquake, 
which proximately caused Property Owner’s personal 
injuries. The District Court granted Operators’ 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that 
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) has 
exclusive jurisdiction over oil and gas operations. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed and 
remanded, holding that “district courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over private tort actions when regulated oil 
and gas operations are at issue.” 
 
Texas 
 
Anderson Energy Corp. v. Dominion Oklahoma 
Exploration & Production, Inc., No. 04-14-00170-CV, 
2015 WL 3956212 (Tex. App. 2015). 
 
Anderson and Dominion’s predecessors-in-interest 
entered into a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), which 
included an area of mutual interest (AMI) clause and a 
first right of refusal clause. Dominion acquired interests 
in the AMI without notifying Anderson, and Anderson 
filed suit for breach of contract. The District Court 
granted Dominion’s motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the “Contract Area” was limited to the 
interests owned by the predecessors when they entered 
into the JOA, and that the JOA was terminable at will 
because the predecessors did not select a term for the 
JOA. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
case for further proceedings, holding that, as a matter of 
law, the “Contract Area” includes interests 
subsequently acquired by the parties and their 
successors, and that the JOA is effective for a 
reasonable time period. 
 
Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, No. 04-14-00521, 2015 
WL 3895902 (Tex. App. 2015). 
 
Appellee’s ancestor conveyed a multiple-acre tract to 
two of her sons reserving an “undivided interest in and 
to the 1/8 royalties paid the landowner upon 
production” that vested in her other six children. 
Medina Interests, Ltd. is the successor-in-interest to the 
two sons who received the initial conveyance. 
Appellees are the successors-in-interest to each of the 
six children named in the deed. On appeal, the Court 
addressed an issue of interpretation of the 1949 deed 
determining whether the reserved undivided interest 
was a fixed or floating royalty. The Court analyzed the 
document in its entirety to determine that a floating 
royalty was reserved, thereby affirming the judgment 
below. 
 
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C and Chesapeake 
Operating, Inc. v. Hyder, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1182, 
2015 WL 3653446 (Tex. 2015). 
 
Lessors brought a claim for breach of contract against 
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. claiming that 
Chesapeake wrongfully deducted post-production costs 
from the Lessor’s royalties as well as over-riding 
royalties despite an express clause prohibiting such 
deductions. In 2004, the Hyder family executed an oil 
and gas lease providing the Hyder family with a 25% 
royalty of gas produced and sold or used from the 
leased premises free and clear of all production and 
post-production costs and expenses. Chesapeake 
claimed that they were entitled to deduct post-
production costs since their proceeds from the third 
party gatherer were less post-production costs. At a 
bench trial, the Court entered a judgment for the 
Hyder family and found that Chesapeake wrongfully 
deducted post-production costs. The decision was 
affirmed by the Appellate Court and ultimately 
reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court held that Operators must carry post-production 
costs when a royalty is based on the proceeds of a 
sale.  
 
Wisconsin 
 
Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green 
Bay, 2015 WL 3419634, No. 2013AP591 (Wis. 
2015). 
 
Oneida Seven sought review of the City of Green 
Bay’s decision to rescind a conditional use permit for 
a renewable energy facility. Oneida Seven proposed a 
renewable energy facility that would take municipal 
solid waste and turn it into energy via a pyrolytic 
gasification system. Although the City initially voted 
to grant the permit, it subsequently voted to rescind 
the conditional use permit on the basis that it was 
obtained through misrepresentation. Oneida Seven 
sought review from the Circuit Court while asserting 
that the City's decision to rescind its conditional use 
permit was arbitrary and not supported by substantial 
evidence. The lower court rejected Oneida Seven's 
arguments. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed 
with Oneida Seven, describing the City's actions as 
“[f]ickle and inconstant.” On certiorari, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin determined that the City's 
decision to rescind the conditional use permit was not 
based on substantial evidence because the City could 
not reasonably conclude that the statements by 
Oneida Seven’s representative to the City 
government regarding the proposed facility's 
emissions and hazardous materials, its stacks, and its 
technology were misrepresentations. 
 
Wyoming 
 
Clay v. Mountain Valley Mineral Ltd. Partnership, 
2015 WY 84, 2015 WL 3623597 (Wyo. 2015). 
 
Mountain Valley brought a declaratory action to 
settle its claim to an undivided 80% mineral interest. 
Mountain Valley claimed that it acquired the mineral 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss2/5
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interest from a default judgment obtained by its 
predecessors in title. In 1976, Mountain Valley’s 
predecessors, record surface owners, brought a quiet 
title action seeking to bar any claim to title from various 
record mineral owners, and obtained a judgment after 
the record mineral owners, the Clays failed to respond 
to the action. The Clays argued that the default 
judgment only applied to the surface since the 
Mountain Valley’s predecessor had no mineral interest 
of record. However, the District Court held that the 
judgment was for fee simple title, and therefore the 
Clays’ claim would be barred indefinitely. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District 
Court, and held that the 1976 quiet title action 
constituted an adverse possession of minerals and the 
default judgment obtained against the Clays barred the 
claim under res judicata. 
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, No. 12-57297, 
2015 WL 3894308 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
revised the critical habitat designation of the Santa 
Anna Sucker to include previously excluded land. 
Several municipalities and water districts filed suit 
against the FWS claiming there was no cooperation 
with the state, the FWS acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and that the FWS violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the FWS. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and held 
that the FWS acted within its discretion because it may 
exclude any area from a critical habitat if it determined 
that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits 
of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat, 
unless the failure to designate such an area as a critical 
habitat will result in the extinction of the species 
concerned. 
 
State 
 
Colorado 
 
St. Jude’s Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, LLC, No. 
13SA132, 2015 WL 3947114 (Colo. 2015). 
 
Private Club filed claims to water under Colorado’s 
prior appropriation system for “aesthetic, recreation, 
and piscatorial uses.” Downstream Agricultural 
Company objected to Club’s claims and filed a separate 
action alleging that Club violated the terms of a prior 
settlement agreement by denying Company access to 
water on Club’s property. The Water Court 
consolidated the parties’ claims, granted appropriative 
rights to Club for the proposed uses, denied all but one 
of Company’s claims, and awarded attorney’s fees to 
Club pursuant to the terms of the prior settlement 
agreement. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in 
part, holding that the Club’s diversion of water was not 
a “beneficial use” as required by Colorado’s prior 
appropriation system. The Colorado Supreme  Court  
affirmed  in part, holding that the evidence  supported 
the Water Court’s interpretation of the prior settlement 
agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia 
Preservation Association v. Special Improvement 
District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation 
District, 2015 CO 52, 2015 WL 3947117 (Colo. 
2015). 
 
The Special Improvement District No. 1 (Subdistrict) 
filed its 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (ARP) with 
the Water Division, and subsequently submitted the 
ARP to the State Engineer for review and approval. 
Objectors challenged the approval of the 2012 ARP 
under the Water Court’s retained jurisdiction. The 
Water Court upheld its initial ruling of validity of the 
ARP. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
affirmed the Water Division’s decision as well as 
denying the notion that a stay on operations of an 
ARP must be enforced until all challenges are 
resolved. The ARP inclusions of replacement water 
for aquifer depletion were found to be adequate to 
prevent injury to senior surface water rights. The 
inclusion of augmentation plan wells as Subdistrict 
wells for the purpose of calculating total groundwater 
depletions were also deemed to be an appropriate 
action. 
 
Concerning the Application for Water Rights of Tidd, 
349 P.3d 259, 2015 CO 39 (Colo. 2015). 
 
Servient Tenement Owners brought action against 
Dominant Tenement Owners for declaratory 
judgment and a conditional water right decree 
regarding use of a water ditch. The District Court 
issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water 
right decree for the Servient Tenement Owners, and 
the Dominant Tenement Owners appealed. The 
Servient Tenement Owner had an easement going 
across its property for a water ditch and sought to 
obtain conditional water rights at the ditch headgate 
for a non-consumptive hydropower use of the water 
that was being diverted for irrigation use. Upon first 
impression, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed, 
holding that small-scale hydropower projects benefit 
the public because they offer an alternative source of 
energy that has generally minimal environmental 
impacts, diverts less water, is less susceptible to 
storm damage, and does not require the creation of 
dams because they rely on existing infrastructure 
from the water ditch.  
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Texas 
 
Harris County Flood Control District v. Kerr, 58 Tex. 
Sup. Ct. J. 1085, 2015 WL 3641517 (Tex. 2015). 
 
Neighborhood developments were built in the 1970s 
and early 1980s with little or no flood damage 
occurring. Further development in the watershed 
without additional safeguards resulted in flood damage 
after several tropical storms occurred between the 
1990s to the 2000s in the area. Landowners and former 
landowners whose properties were damaged by the 
tropical flooding brought suit for inverse condemnation 
and nuisance against the county and flood control 
district. On appeal from the Houston Court of Appeals, 
the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that a question 
of fact exists to each element of the homeowners’ 
taking claim and that the government entities’ 
jurisdiction pleas should be denied.  
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
 
9th Circuit 
 
National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. E.P.A., 2015 
WL 3559149 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), when a state 
fails to develop a State Implementation Program (SIP) 
to reduce regional haze, the EPA must implement a 
Federal Implementation Program (FIP). In 2006, the 
State of Montana notified the EPA that it would not 
develop a SIP. Subsequently, the EPA proposed a FIP 
for the State of Montana. The Program required the 
Montana PPL (MPPL) implement new technologies to 
reduce emissions in order to eliminate regional haze. 
MPPL challenged the program and claimed the EPA 
failed to justify the proposed requirements. The 
National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) also 
challenged the FIP and claimed the proposal failed to 
provide reasoning for its lenient determinations. 
Despite these objections, the EPA issued a final rule. 
After the MPPL and the NPCA petitioned for review, 
the Appellate Court found that the EPA’s findings 
were arbitrary and capricious and held that the EPA 
failed to justify or explain its determinations as 
required under the CAA. 
 
District of Columbia 
 
Mississippi Com’n on Environmental Quality v. 
E.P.A., 2015 WL 3461262 (D.C. 2015). 
 
The EPA is required to promulgate National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). After the EPA sets 
the NAAQS, it must determine compliance and 
maximum level of pollutant concentrations in the 
atmosphere. In 2008, the EPA set and promulgated 
new primary and secondary NAAQS for ambient 
zones and, over the last seven years, the EPA has 
collaborated with petitioners over area-designations. 
Several companies, environmental groups, counties, 
and states petitioned for review of the EPA’s 
determination that certain geographic areas were 
designated as not attaining EPA’s ground-level ozone  
NAAQS.  The Court of Appeals held that the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, determination of  
NAAQS, and  designation of the attainment areas was 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
State 
 
Michigan 
 
Johnson v. Department of Natural Resources, 2015 
WL 3476408 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) 
 
Plaintiff owns hunting ranch Bear Mountain, L.L.C., 
where customers pay a fee to “harvest” Russian boars. 
Russian boars are not native to Michigan and have 
been deemed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as 
an environmental danger to both humans and 
livestock. In response to a growing problem of wild 
hog overpopulation, the Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) issued the Invasive Species 
Order Amendment No. 1 (ISO) which outlawed the 
possession of certain species of swine, including the 
Russian boar. Michigan DNR has appealed the lower 
court’s judgment that the ISO was unconstitutional on 
due process grounds as well as being void for 
vagueness. The Court of Appeals of Michigan 
reversed, holding that, “as a regulatory action that 
does not implicate fundamental rights, the ISO is 
subject to rational-basis review.” Using that standard, 
the Court found that the ISO was rationally related to 
the protection and welfare of the citizens of Michigan.  
 
South Dakota 
 
Grant County Concerned Citizens v. Grant County Bd. 
of Adjustment, 2015 S.D. 54, 2015 WL 3898080 (S.D. 
2015). 
 
The Grant County Board of Adjustment approved 
Limited Liability Company (LLC) for a conditional 
use permit to construct a concentrated animal feeding 
operation. Concerned Citizen’s Coalition and 
Landowner sought judicial review of the Board’s 
decision. The Circuit Court affirmed the County 
Board’s decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota determined the Coalition’s due process 
rights were not violated and held that the board 
properly exercised its authority in granting the 
application, and that the Coalition failed to show that 
the Board had relied on fraudulent information in 
granting the application. 
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ARTICLES OF INTEREST 
 
OIL AND GAS 
 
Alexander Bukac, Fracking and the Public Trust Doctrine: This Land is Their Land, But After Robinson, Might This 
Land Really Be Our Land?, 49 U.S.F. L. Rev. 361 (2015). 
 
Harvey Reiter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-State and Foreign Competition from State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards: Why the Dormant Commerce Clause Provides Important Protection for Consumers and 
Environmentalists, 36 Energy L. J. 45 (2015). 
 
S. Scott Gaille, How Can Governments Accelerate International Shale Development?, 36 Energy L. J. 95 (2015). 
 
Hillary Hellmann, Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United States Pipeline Scada Systems, 36 Energy L. J. 157 
(2015). 
 
AGRICULTURE 
 
Sandy Manche, Maintaining the Highway Infrastructure as Alternative Fuel Vehicle Usage Increases, 7 Ky. J. 
Equine, Agric. & Nat. Resources L. 515 (2014-2015). 
 
For a more complete list of articles related to agricultural law, please consult the Agricultural Law Bibliography of 
the National Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/reporter/caseindexes/. This bibliography 
is updated quarterly and provides a comprehensive listing of agricultural law articles. 
 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
